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Abstract 
This essay considers how legal and philosophical ideals relate to contemporary politics. While 
political commentary is often concerned with descriptive analysis of public affairs, this essay 
pursues normative analysis of emerging trends in public life. The essay’s underlying theme is 
that “liberal” states—such as the United States—from time to time become illiberal by departing 
from the basic legal and philosophical norms of that tradition. Although it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions while in the moment, the tentative conclusion is that we are in the midst of 
a departure from liberal norms. The essay takes a discursive approach—drawing upon 
Appalachian culture, popular culture, and personal narrative—to highlight the altered trajectory 
from those norms. 
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Introduction: Hillbillies and Descriptive Politics 
It is of course unbecoming to broach politics at many times and in many places, not just in social 
gatherings of mixed company, but also in various academic fields where one might seek to stay 
above the fray of pundits and ideologues. These etiquette and academic norms are particularly 
apt in the current political context, as we seem to have reached peak handwringing since 
November 8, 2016. Nevertheless, there is still among many a persistent desire to find new ways 
to makes sense of what strikes them as uncharted political waters. In a way, this is what J. D. 
Vance attempted to do in his popular book, Hillbilly Elegy. Although the book was written 
before the election, it exemplifies a novel attempt to provide context for this moment in history. 
The approach is personal memoir—or, more accurately, as Dwight Billings has critically 
described it, presuming “to write the ‘memoir’ of a culture”—mixed with a bit of sociological 
analysis. So while the book is very much Vance’s story about his family, he also uses that story 
 
 
(along with some data culled from a variety of sources) to describe why those of us from a 
particular region are the way we are. This is an important tactic because most of the 
handwringing about the current political situation is related to the question, “how did this 
happen”? The surprising and horrifying (to many) outcome of the election must be tempered 
with recognition that a great many people (though not a majority) are pleased with these results. 
This is where Vance’s personal/cultural memoir comes into play because it seems to provide a 
sociological analysis of a swath of the electorate that has received little attention in the past: 
poor, white Americans in and around Appalachia. In other words, Vance makes a descriptive 
claim about how we got here: He describes the conditions and circumstances of a significant 
portion of the electorate (with an emphasis on his own family), and that description presumably 
can help us make sense of the recent political context.  
The people that Vance describes are often referred to as “hillbillies” and “rednecks”. In a 
sense, the use of pejoratives like these is emblematic of a larger divide in America that became 
fully manifest in the 2016 campaign and election. Vance’s descriptive analysis thus provides 
some much-needed context. Nevertheless, it is important to make clear what Vance’s book does 
not do (and does not try to do): provide a substantive normative analysis regarding whether the 
electorate’s positions are justified. Further, if one discounts the predominantly shrill normative 
pronouncements from the left—“They’re all racists!”—Hillbilly Elegy is far from being alone in 
sidestepping this crucial part of the conversation. The goal of this commentary is to add a dose of 
normativity to the cultural conversation. But before doing that, I should clarify two points about 
what this article is not and what it is.  
First, it is not an assessment nor a review of Hillbilly Elegy. My comments about the 
book rather serve as a jumping off point for a different sort of conversation—a conversation 
 
 
about legal and philosophical norms in politics. It is important, though, to acknowledge that 
Hillbilly Elegy is a vexed subject in the field of Appalachian studies. Although no one suggests 
that Vance does not have the right to tell his story, many in this field oppose the idea that his 
story (and any related analysis) should be construed as speaking for the entire region. This is 
particularly worrisome because as scholars such as Anthony Harkins have shown, Appalachia 
has long been a region rife with stereotypes and outsider misinterpretations. At times, Vance’s 
personal story does seem to wield those stereotypes to answer broader, descriptive questions 
about that region. Second, this essay is not a research paper that seeks to add nuance to an 
existing body of academic work—whether in the fields of philosophy and law or Appalachian 
studies. Rather, it is an essay—in the traditional sense of the word—that seeks to spark new 
conversations by engaging with a variety of ideas about how legal and political norms relate to 
contemporary politics. To that end, it embraces a somewhat free form structure and—with a nod 
to Hillbilly Elegy—a certain degree of personal narrative.  
Normative Pejoratives   
To begin, consider Vance’s use of pejoratives (“hillbilly,” “redneck,” “white trash”) and how 
they might frame a discussion of descriptivity versus normativity. While he at times uses these 
terms normatively to express value judgments (for instance, he writes that his people have good 
traits such as “a fierce dedication to family and country,” but also bad ones such as “not lik[ing] 
outsiders or people who are different” (3)), Vance primarily uses these terms descriptively. In 
other words, the pejoratives highlight his ethnicity (Scots-Irish) and geography (Appalachian 
Mountains and southern Ohio), which cohere into a “culture of Greater Appalachia” (4). That 
culture describes particular “family structures, religion, and politics” (3) marred by low social 
mobility and poverty, which in turn “encourages social decay instead of counteracting it” (7). 
 
 
Unlike these descriptive claims (which describe how things are), normative claims are those that 
take the form, “We ought to do X,” or, “We ought not do X.” A normative analysis thus 
considers whether something is justified—whether it is right and obligatory in light of some 
objective criteria. There are of course many kinds of norms: social, cultural, political, legal, 
moral, and so on. Sometimes these norms overlap and sometimes they do not. Although social, 
cultural, and etiquette norms might make swearing at the dinner table unjustified, there is no 
legal norm that makes such conduct wrong. On the other hand, the moral norm, “You ought not 
rape people” is also a legal norm—as well as a prudential norm and a social norm. 
There are also norms of political philosophy, which might be characterized as a subset of 
norms within moral philosophy. So while moral philosophy (and its related norms) might 
consider what one ought to do, political philosophy (and its related norms) more specifically 
examines what we ought to do as a political society (among other things). One way to determine 
whether a particular claim is justified in a political society is to examine whether the claim is 
consistent with the basic tenets of the society’s tradition. For example, societies that are broadly 
part of the liberal tradition conceive of persons as “free and equal.” That might sound like a 
platitude, but it is nevertheless a core platitude of the liberal tradition. So, for instance, any 
political position or policy that treats persons discriminatorily in a liberal society is wrong in 
light of the liberal conception of persons as free and equal. Accordingly, a normative analysis 
might make the claim that discriminatory policies in a liberal society are wrong by virtue of 
liberal political norms—as well as norms of liberal legal systems (though, historically, the law 
does not always reflect ideal political norms). 
It is interesting—and evocative—to distinguish the descriptive and normative approaches 
that one might use to examine our current political situation by invoking the two pejoratives 
 
 
mentioned above: hillbilly and redneck. As the book’s title makes clear, Vance self-identifies 
with the term hillbilly. This makes sense considering the region upon which he focuses and his 
family’s use of the term, but it raises a novel question: To what extent might one make a 
rhetorical distinction between hillbillies and rednecks? Consider a rough comparison of the two 
pejoratives. Both are of course derogatory, connoting ignorance and a lack of sophistication, and 
both connote a separateness from “mainstream” culture. But most believe that redneck further 
connotes a sort of meanness that is specifically associated with bigotry. Redneck is also more 
closely associated with the South generally, rather than Appalachia specifically, though the two 
regions overlap geographically and culturally. To see a superficial and telling distinction of the 
differing degrees of meanness associated with the two terms, compare the stereotypical—and 
hypercritical—image of rednecks in Randy Newman’s 1974 song, “Rednecks” (with its focus on 
racism) and the stereotypical image of hillbillies in the television show, The Beverly Hillbillies 
(with its focus on a backward but benign family from the Ozarks). The contrast is stark in this 
particular case, though one must be cautious about generalizing (consider, for example, the 
hillbillies in James Dickey’s Deliverance). 
Indeed, the distinction includes a sweeping claim about the unilinear meaning of cultural 
signifiers—a claim supported by only brief references to popular culture texts—which is very 
nearly as bad as using stereotypes to describe an entire region. And to be sure, it would be 
difficult to provide a precise contemporary meaning for the two pejoratives even if the focus was 
upon etymology rather than popular culture. This is in part because both terms might be said to 
transcend a particular ethnicity and geography in our time. Moreover, there is no doubt that there 
is a great deal of overlap with respect to the non-moral and moral aspects of hillbillies and 
rednecks: Hillbillies can be bigots and rednecks can live in the mountains. But the point of the 
 
 
distinction is rhetorical, not to carve nature at its joints. The distinction can be an illuminating 
way to frame the different kinds of questions—descriptive (as in Hillbilly Elegy) and normative 
(as in what I might call “redneck elegy”)—that may be asked about the state of the polity. If one 
assumes that hillbilly connotes more strongly a cluster of nonmoral attributes (mountain-
dwelling, family-oriented, un-cosmopolitan, for example), then it makes sense to focus upon a 
descriptive answer to our original question: how did this happen? Vance and others provide that 
answer by focusing upon sociology broadly construed, helping us understand how our country 
arrived where it is today. 
But if one assumes that redneck more strongly connotes a cluster of moral attributes 
(various types of bigotry, for example), then it makes sense to examine normative questions and 
answers, too. In other words, the question in this case is not only how did this happen in the 
United States?, but also is this justified in the United States? The idea, then, is not to provide an 
exegesis of the two pejoratives, but rather to clarify our descriptive and our normative questions 
and answers when we talk about groups of people variously referred to as hillbillies and 
rednecks. It is of course helpful to provide a descriptive analysis of how we got here, but it is an 
inherent feature of descriptive answers that they tell us nothing about what we ought to do—or 
whether the conceptual place we have reached is justified. 
A further reason to focus upon normative rather than descriptive questions is that they are 
the ones that have received short shrift. There has certainly been a public and media outcry 
against the blatant examples of bigotry that have become more and more “mainstream” in recent 
years. However, much of the bigotry still lies below the surface, disguised as viable policy 
options regarding security and law enforcement, how to respond to perceived social and 
economic decay, and so on. The lack of systematic attention to the moral components of these 
 
 
issues is due in part to the worry that moral analysis is inevitably subjective and thus of little 
value. Who cares what some political pundit—or, worse, some academic—thinks is right and 
wrong? This can be a reasonable objection, and so there must be some way to reconcile 
objectivity and normativity. Surprisingly, this is not a terribly tall order. We need only clarify our 
legal and moral commitments to sketch answers to questions about what is and is not permissible 
for our electorate and political leaders. 
Narrative and Normativity  
In moving toward normative questions about politics, I would be remiss not to first disclose the 
extent to which I personally have a dog in the fight. Admittedly, I am a card-carrying Southerner. 
I grew up in Arkansas. Since my early twenties, I have lived in Tennessee and (primarily) 
Virginia. I prefer living in this part of the country. Geographically, there are the Blue Ridge 
Mountains, the proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, and a number of diverse cities within striking 
distance of my home in southwest Virginia. Culturally, I enjoy the slower-paced, friendly 
attributes of smaller, southern towns. I am not a foodie. My ideal breakfast involves cheese grits, 
bacon, blueberry muffins, and black coffee. I like football, full stop. I am also acutely aware of 
the way that negative stereotypes are lobbed at southerners (and embraced by our political 
leaders) that are often critical of the very aspects of the South that I cherish. Accordingly, if I am 
biased, it is in favor of the region in which I grew up.  
Like many southerners, I also appreciate the commitments of the liberal tradition: a 
political philosophy based upon freedom and equality. And I like the Constitution. It is these two 
things that naturally provide an anchor of objectivity for normative arguments. Assuming one is 
not seeking some sort of nonliberal revolution (whether fascist, Marxist, or some other variety), 
then here is at least one possible way to provide a normative account of the electorate’s values. 
 
 
Consider the question: is the electorate pursuing policies that are in line with our country’s 
political morality (values and principles that help define our particular conception of justice), as 
well as our country’s laws (chiefly, the Constitution)? Answering this question shows the extent 
to which the electorate’s positions are consistent with both the Constitution and our country’s 
tradition of political morality. Still, one might wonder how it is possible to identify the core 
values and principles that help define our particular conception of justice. And perhaps it is even 
more difficult to identify the central (central to whom?) legal principles that help define who we 
are as a country. Despite these obvious difficulties, there is perhaps a way forward.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein was famous for describing language in terms of family 
resemblances in light of the different ways that language is used. To make the point, he described 
how things such as games share many overlapping features, yet there is no single feature that all 
games share. Although it is not a perfect analogy, something similar can be said with respect to 
the overlapping features of our country’s political morality and legal commitments. Taking 
positions (perhaps even unknowingly) that depart from those overlapping features is wrong 
because it is wrong to depart from the values and principles that help define our country’s 
conception of justice. 
For example, most people believe that John Locke’s philosophy had an important impact 
on our system of government, at least in that it profoundly impacted the framers of the 
Constitution. Among many other things, Locke is known for his social contract theory, a 
cooperative conception of political community in which persons act reciprocally to produce a 
morally and prudentially superior condition. Under the theory, the state’s authority is based upon 
persons voluntarily entering the cooperative scheme. The theory underscores an ideal conception 
of persons as free and equal and governed by the rule of law rather than by arbitrary decisions of 
 
 
unelected political officials. And though it is well known that Locke’s theory focuses on the 
protection of property rights, his proviso is less often noted: we ought to treat others fairly by 
leaving enough resources for them.  
We can glean a few things from this philosophical backdrop. Our theory of government is 
based in part upon the idea that working together has both prudential and moral benefits. A 
political community can protect an individual’s property rights by collectively providing security 
and centralizing the right to punish. This promotes the rule of law by eliminating bias and 
personal incapacity. And while Locke’s theory does not support egalitarian redistribution, it does 
require a basic notion of fairness that involves leaving enough for everyone. And this perhaps 
means that we must downsize our collective share of resources when all resources are exhausted 
or “owned.” 
The political morality espoused by those who self-identify as (and claim to speak for) 
rednecks typically shuns this commitment to reciprocity. A common refrain is rather a call to 
“take back the country,” presumably from the “others” who are “free riders.” Anecdotally, I 
cannot visit distant family and acquaintances in Arkansas without hearing some form of this 
view—often tinged with both implicit and explicit bigotry. The last two years have made it clear 
that such thinking is not just a straw man. Recent political sentiments have morphed into a real 
and powerful movement that harkens back to some of the darkest days in our country’s history. 
But even if one interprets these political movements charitably (as not primarily an expression of 
ethnic and cultural bigotry but rather, say, an austere form of nationalism), can they be 
reconciled with the cooperative ideals that underpin our theory of government? Those who claim 
to speak for rednecks often assert that it is the “others” who are not pulling their weight. They 
will grant that life has dealt many people a bad hand, but insist that those unfortunate souls must 
 
 
show some personal responsibility and pull themselves up by the bootstraps. Most have a story to 
prove the point, like the one about my granddad. 
Bill Hunt, who died in 2014, was born in rural, racist southern Arkansas in 1928. Raised 
by an abusive, alcoholic father, he moved to a new house when his father decided that arson was 
the only way out of a bad financial predicament. Defending himself and his mother from his 
father’s abuse yielded an unusual degree of toughness. Although he was not a big guy, he 
became known as one of the best football players in a town (Fordyce) that had nothing going for 
it except football. He received a scholarship to play for Bear Bryant at the University of 
Kentucky, but ultimately returned to the University of Arkansas at Monticello. There, he was a 
star athlete and class Vice President. From these humble beginnings, my granddad rose to be 
Coach, Principal, and then Superintendent in the Malvern, Arkansas School District, not long 
after the “Little Rock Nine” attempted to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High School in 1957. 
He played a leading role in completing the racial integration of Malvern’s schools in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. There is a school building in Malvern named after him. 
I view my granddad—literally and figuratively—as one in a million. His ability to rise 
above the bad hand he was dealt in life was exceptional. Should the exception become the rule 
for others? As is well known, many people in America have stories that involve similar (or 
worse) hardships. Although most of those stories do not end like my granddad’s, perhaps 
Vance’s story should count as one that has a similarly happy ending inasmuch as he also 
overcame a crisis of family and culture. But the great majority of people do not overcome the 
hand they were dealt. The question is not whether my granddad and others deserve the 
circumstances into which they are born. They obviously do not. The question is whether the 
principles of our cooperative scheme permit us to turn our backs on those like them even if they 
 
 
are from a different ethnicity or country. In many ways, Vance suggests that the central problem 
with the culture he describes is not political, but rather that “[t]oo many young men [are] 
immune to hard work . . . and have a willingness to blame everyone but [themselves]” (7). In 
other words, he seems to view the problem as less about the nature of the polity, and more about 
the need for folks to develop character and a work ethic. The implicit philosophical question is 
not an easy one, in part because those of us who received a good hand in life might feel entitled 
to it (even if we do not deserve it) and might prefer to leave others to the task of improving their 
characters and work ethic. In contemporary political philosophy, this raises the debate between 
liberal theories of social justice (exemplified by the work of John Rawls) and libertarian theories 
(exemplified by the work of Robert Nozick). That debate often leads to polarizing conclusions: 
an austere libertarian ideal that is closer to the so-called “classical liberal” state on the one hand, 
or an egalitarian ideal that is closer to the so-called “welfare state” on the other hand. It would of 
course be an understatement to say that there is deep tension among ideals such as freedom, 
liberty, equality, fairness, reciprocity, duty, and so on. 
Fortunately, we need not get bogged down in academic debates. Our Constitution speaks 
for itself. Right there in the beginning, the Preamble states that the Constitution is established to 
“promote the general Welfare.” The point is reiterated in the Taxing and Spending Clause, which 
states that “Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” Similarly, the Fifth 
Amendment permits private property to be taken for public use. What this means is that the 
Constitution is in no way a libertarian document. It is rather a document that is consistent with 
the view that our government is based upon principles that entail working together in a 
cooperative scheme. No amount of Gadsden (“Don’t tread on me.”) flags and license plates will 
 
 
change what the Constitution states clearly. Broadly speaking, then, our legal and political norms 
establish at least a minimum commitment to collective responsibility, which attempts to account 
for the inherently unfair starting positions that people have in society.  
Does this mean that we ought to become a paradigm of socialism, embracing the welfare 
state and inviting social decay while in search of utopian socioeconomic equality? Of course not. 
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated in Lochner v. New York, the Constitution “is not 
intended to embody a particular economic theory.” Along the same lines, though, we should not 
be surprised when our government spends money to prevent people from dying in poverty who 
cannot afford healthcare (which, for what it’s worth, seems consistent with the Christian ethics 
that so many self-identified “rednecks” espouse). Instead of an economic theory, the 
Constitution—and the philosophical theories on which it is based—reflect principles about how 
we relate to each other as a community and account for each other’s welfare. This includes the 
ideal conception of persons as free to pursue their life projects with the confidence that they 
enjoy an equal social and legal status—regardless of differences such as ethnicity and religion—
that is protected from arbitrary government power. We of course see this in the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses, the First Amendment’s protection of expression, and the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable and warrantless searches and seizures. The 
realization of these commitments is not possible without collective responsibility and reciprocity. 
It is important, then, to articulate why an electorate that disagrees with these principles is wrong, 
not just how it reached the point of disagreement. 
As a former law enforcement officer, it is important to me that we make good on the 
social contract’s promise of providing a secure society (sometimes described as “law and 
order”). But as someone who now teaches criminal procedure and constitutional law, it is also 
 
 
important to me that we provide that security in a constitutional way. It is, for instance, 
constitutional for the police to “stop and frisk,” but not if they do so in a discriminatory way. 
More broadly, the law and political morality on which our country is based make clear that it is 
unjust to treat any human as worth less than another human or as having an inferior social and 
legal status. Indeed, it was troubling to hear that the President of the United States recently told a 
group of police not to be “too nice” to “thugs” when they are arrested, and that it is unnecessary 
to protect a suspect’s head when a suspect is arrested and placed into a police vehicle. As a 
former FBI Special Agent, I had to place cuffed suspects in the back of vehicles from time to 
time. Given that background, it is shocking when I hear norms against police brutality being 
treated as a joke. In a sense, this is an instance (one of many) in which the President of the 
United States channeled the subcultural norms with which Vance is troubled, as Vance states: 
“Manliness meant strength, courage, a willingness to fight” (245). In other words, the machismo-
steeped sentiment endorsed by the President is the same sentiment that is—according to Vance—
contributing to Appalachia’s hardships. Government policy may not alter these subcultural 
norms that Vance describes, but it makes sense for us to be clear that many of those values are 
inconsistent with the broader norms of our legal and political tradition. And it goes without 
saying that it would be helpful if our political leaders did not perpetuate those inconsistencies. 
There are a number of other examples that might give one pause. Again, as a former FBI 
Agent, it was troubling to see the firing of FBI Director James Comey in the middle of an 
investigation involving the president’s campaign associates (and their contact with the Russian 
government). Whatever one may think about the investigation itself, it is natural to wonder about 
the status of the rule of law generally, and, specifically, whether it is possible for the FBI to 
become a mere instrument of political whim. Likewise, while it might be correct to say that the 
 
 
President has unlimited pardon power in a case like the one involving Sheriff Joe Arpaio, it is 
also reasonable to question whether the Arpaio pardon is uniquely different from past pardons 
inasmuch as it was issued before the judicial process concluded. To be sure, there have been 
many notoriously objectionable pardons, but did this one involve a fundamental departure from 
the long-standing legal and political norms of due process, equal protection, separation of 
powers, and the rule of law? And, if so, are we in the midst of a broader departure from the 
norms of liberalism? Is it now normal to wonder—as the President of the United States allegedly 
did—why we receive immigrants from “shithole” African countries rather places such as 
Norway? There are other, more serious indications (perhaps less connected to official 
government actions and policy) that we are in the midst of a sea change, not least the recent 
uptick in white nationalist movements. This trend included several rallies in Charlottesville and 
at the University of Virginia—where I completed my doctoral work—that resulted in the murder 
of Heather Heyer, who was peacefully counterprotesting when a neo-Nazi drove his car into the 
crowd in which she was standing. Raising these worries may seem alarmist to some, but the 
simple point is that a polity’s legal and philosophical norms—such as human dignity, legitimate 
policing (or the right to protest illegitimate policing during the national anthem), and the rule of 
law—have practical applications that govern what our public institutions should and shouldn’t 
do. They also tell us something about the rightness and wrongness of any divergent subcultural 
values. 
Here is the upshot: The views of rednecks (or the views assigned to them and embraced 
by political leaders) are not divorced from intellectual history, but rather have ties to political 
traditions that are in direct opposition to the basic legal and philosophical tenets of the liberal 
tradition. By framing the conversation in this way, it is perhaps possible to deepen and expand 
 
 
the way we engage with these opposing beliefs and the people who hold them. It is not simply 
that rednecks and their political enablers are “ignorant,” but rather that the actions and policies of 
our political leaders are often inconsistent with the legal and philosophical norms of our political 
tradition (and sometimes inconsistent with the actual views of those who self-identify as 
rednecks). Regardless, then, of whether we carve up the electorate into disparate groups (and 
many would argue such carving is inappropriate), sociological analysis is not the end of the 
story. There are also important normative questions to answer.  
Admittedly, I have painted with a broad brush. Concrete solutions to social problems 
require nuanced policy. Toward the end of Hillbilly Elegy, Vance is resigned that there are no 
good solutions to the underlying cultural problems he examines: A “magical public policy 
solution” does not exist (238). He says this in part because he believes that these problems—
inasmuch as they are problems of “family, faith, and culture”—cannot be solved through 
government policy (238). Although that may very well be true, it of course does not change the 
fact that those familial, religious, and cultural norms may be inconsistent (and unjustified) with 
respect to the broader norms of political morality. To be sure, the fact that we can describe a 
problem as having two sides—and that the problem is in some sense intractable and beyond 
reconciliation for one or both sides—does not mean that the two sides are equal or equally 
justified. It is for this reason that clarifying our normative commitments can at least illuminate 
the ground rules of any attempt to solve societal problems. Given our commitments of law and 
political morality, the logical conclusion is that the values and policies of those who claim to 
speak for rednecks are often wrong. Not because I or anyone else says so, but because their 
positions are inconsistent with the basic tenets of a liberal constitutional democracy, as well as 
the Constitution itself. 
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